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Abstract
  Analyses of the deployment of technology in schools usually note its lack
of impact on the day-to-day values and practices of teachers, administrators,
and students. This is generally construed as an implementation failure, or as
resulting from a temperamental shortcoming on the part of teachers or
technologists. It is predicated on the tacit assumption that the technology itself
is value-free. This paper proposes that technology is never neutral: that its
values and practices must always either support or subvert those of the
organization into which it is placed; and that the failures of technology to alter
the look-and-feel of schools more generally results from a mismatch between
the values of school organization and those embedded within the contested
technology.
THE CULTURE OF SCHOOLS
  For nearly a century outsiders have been trying to introduce technologies
into high school classrooms, with remarkably consistent results. After
proclaiming the potential of the new tools to rescue the classroom from the dark
ages and usher in an age of efficiency and enlightenment, technologists find to
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their dismay that teachers can often be persuaded to use the new tools only
slightly, if at all. They find further that, even when the tools are used, classroom
practice--the look-and-feel of schools --remains fundamentally unchanged.
Indeed, the last technologies to have had a lasting impact on the organization
and practice of schooling were the textbook and the blackboard.
  What is often overlooked, however, is that schools themselves are a
technology, a way of knowing applied to a specific goal, albeit one so familiar
that it has become transparent. They are systems for preserving and
transmitting information and authority, for inculcating certain values and
practices while minimizing or eliminating others, and have evolved over the past
one hundred years or so to perform this function more efficiently (Tyack, 1974).
Since schools do not deal in the transmission of all possible knowledge or the
promotion of the entire range of human experience but only a fairly stable
subset thereof, and since their form has remained essentially unchanged over
this time, we can even say that schools have been optimized for the job we
entrust to them, that over time the technology of schooling has been tuned.
When schools are called upon to perform more "efficiently," to maximize
outputs of whatever type (high school or college graduates, skilled workers,
patriotic citizens, public support for education and educators) from a given set of
inputs (money, students, staff, legal mandates, public confidence), it is their
capacity to act as technologies, as rational institutions, that is being called upon.
It is expected that, after analyzing the facts at hand and determining that a
problem exists (high drop-out rates or functional illiteracy, for instance) and
within the limits of their discretion (since they are not free to act however they
wish), schools will attempt to implement an optimal solution, the one that yields
the most bang for the buck. This expectation, too, derives from the assumption
that schools, since they are purpose-built machines, will pursue the rational,
deductive means-ends approach that characterizes rational pursuits. Following
this, it is also expected that schools will embrace, indeed will clamor for, any
technology that would help them increase their productivity, to perform more
efficiently and effectively. It seems natural that they should employ the same
tools that have led the world outside the classroom to become a much more
information-dense environment, tools like film, television, and computers.
Certainly many educational technologists reflexively expect such a response,
and are both miffed and baffled when it is not immediately or abundantly
forthcoming.
  But schools are not simply technologies, nor are they purely or even
mainly rational in the ways in which they respond to a given set of conditions.
They also have other purposes, other identities, seek other outputs. They are,
perhaps first and foremost, organizations, and as such seek nothing so much as
their own perpetuity. Entrenched or mature organizations (like the organisms to
which they are functionally and etymologically related) experience change or the
challenge to change most significantly as a disruption, an intrusion, as a failure
of organismic defenses. This is true ten-fold for public schools since they and
their employees are exempt from nearly every form of outside pressure which
can be brought to bear on organizations that must adapt or die (Chubb & Moe,
1990; Friedman, 1962).
  Organizations are not rational actors: their goal is not to solve a defined
problem but to relieve the stress on the organization caused by pressure
operating outside of or overwhelming the capacity of normal channels. Their
method is not a systematic evaluation of means and ends to produce an
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optimum response, but rather a trial-and-error rummaging through Standard
Operating Procedures to secure a satisficing response. As organizational
entities, schools and the people who work in them must be less than impressed
by the technologists' promises of greater efficiency or optimized outcomes. The
implied criticism contained in those promises and the disruption of routine their
implementations foreshadow, even (or especially) for the most dramatic of
innovations, are enough to consign them to the equipment closet. What
appears to outsiders as a straightforward improvement can, to an organization,
be felt as undesirably disruptive if it means that the culture must change its
values and habits in order to implement it. Since change is its own downside,
organization workers must always consider, even if unconsciously, the
magnitude of the disruption an innovation will engender when evaluating its net
benefit and overall desirability. This circumspection puts schools directly at odds
with the rational premises of technologists for whom the maximization of
organizational culture and values almost always takes a back seat to the
implementation of an 'optimal' response to a set of conditions defined as
problematic. Indeed, a characteristic if unspoken assumption of technologists
and of the rational model in general is that cultures are infinitely malleable and
accommodating to change. As we'll see later, schools' natural resistance to
organizational change plays an important (though not necessarily determining)
role in shaping their response to technological innovation.
  Organizations are defined by their lines of flow of power, information, and
authority. Schools as workplaces are hierarchical in the extreme, with a
pyramidal structure of power, privilege, and access to information. (Indeed,
proponents of the "hidden curriculum" theory of schooling propose that
acceptance of hierarchy is one of the main object lessons schools are supposed
to impart.) At the bottom, in terms of pay, prestige, and formal autonomy are
teachers. Next up are building-level administrators, and finally, district-level
administrators. Although students have even less power than teachers, and
state-level actors more power than district administrators, neither of these
groups is considered a part of school organizational culture (Fullan, 1991). Any
practice (and a technology is, after all, a set of practices glued together by
values) that threatens to disrupt this existing structure will meet tremendous
resistance at both adoption and implementation stages. A technology that
reinforces existing lines of power and information is likely to be adopted (a
management decision) but may or may not be implemented (a classroom-level
decision). The divergence of interests between managers and workers, and the
potential implementation fissures along those lines, is a source of much of the
implementation failure of widely-touted "advances."
  Finally, in addition to their rational and organizational elements, schools
are also profoundly normative institutions. Most obviously, schools are often
both actors and venues for the performance of significant shifts in social mores
and policy. Within the lifetime of many Americans, for example, schools have
institutionalized successive notions of separate-and-unequal,
separate-but-equal, equal resources for all, and, most recently, unequal
resources for unequal needs as reifications of our shifting cultural conceptions
of "fairness." Because schools are the ubiquitous intersection between the
public and the private spheres of life, feelings about what "values" should and
should not be represented in the curriculum run deep and strong among
Americans, even those without school-age children. When thinking about
values, however, it is crucial to remember that schools generally do not seek
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this contentious role for themselves. More often than not it is imposed upon
them by legislators, the courts, community activists, and others whose agenda,
though it may to some degree overlap with that of the schools', has a different
origin and a different end (See Note 1). For if anything, the norms of school
culture are profoundly conservative, in the sense that the underlying mission of
schools is the conservation and transmission of pre-existing, pre-defined
categories of knowledge and being. As David Cohen points out, the structure of
schools and the nature of teaching have remained substantially unchanged for
seven hundred years, and there exists in the popular mind a definite,
conservative conception of what schools should be like, a template from which
schools stray only at their peril (Cohen, 1987).
  When parents or others speak with disapproval of the "values" that are or
are not being transmitted to children in schools they largely miss the point. For
the values that predominate most of all, that indeed must always predominate,
are less the set of moral and social precepts which the critics have in mind than
the institutional and organizational values on which the school itself is founded:
respect for hierarchy, competitive individualization, a receptivity to being ranked
and judged, and the division of the world of knowledge into discreet units and
categories susceptible to mastery (Dreeben, 1968). To a very great extent these
values are shared in common with our other large-scale institutions, business
and government. Indeed, if they were not, it seems most unlikely that they
would predominate in schools. They are, in fact, the core values of the
bourgeois humanism that has been developing in the West since the
Enlightenment, and it is these norms and values, more than the shifting and
era-bound constructions of social good, that schools enact in their normative
capacity. There is a tight coupling between these values and
schools-as-a-technology, just as there is between any technology and the
values it operationalizes. Given this linkage it's often difficult to say with
certainty whether school values predate the technology of schools-as-
we-know-them, in which case the technology is a dependent tool dedicated to
the service of an external mandate, or whether the technology produces, sui
generis, a set of values of its own which are then propagated through society by
school graduates. When it is this difficult to extract a technology from its
context, you know you have found a tool that does its job very, very well.
SCHOOL WORKERS
 In manifesting its culture, school places teachers and administrators in an
unusual and contradictory position. They are subjected to many of the
limitations of highly bureaucratic organizations but are denied the support and
incentive structures with which bureaucracies usually offset such constraints.
School workers are the objects of recurring scrutiny from interested and
influential parties outside of what is generally conceived of as the "school
system," many of whom have conflicting (and often inchoate) expectations for
what schools should accomplish. Their means, ends, and abilities are regularly
called into question by parents, politicians, social scientists, the business
community, and any group with an ideological axe to grind, not least by those
who consider themselves to be allies of schools. Yet teachers and
administrators almost always lack the rights of self-definition and discretionary
control of resources (time, money, curriculum) that generally accompany this
kind of accountability to give it form and meaning. Despite their strident protests
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school workers are treated more as day laborers than as professionals.
 At the same time, even the most complacent bureaucracies direct some
incentives at their workers. These may be monetary, in the form of performance
bonuses or stock options, career enhancing in the form of promotions, or
sanctions like demotion and the consequent loss of authority and responsibility.
Schools generally offer none of these. Instead they proffer to good and bad
alike a level of job security that would be the envy of a Japanese sarariman:
unless you commit a felony or espouse views unpopular in your community you
are essentially guaranteed employment for as long as you like, no matter what
the quality of your work. Teachers cannot be demoted: there is no position of
lesser authority or responsibility within schools. Just as students are essentially
rewarded with promotion for filling seats and not causing trouble, so teachers
are paid and promoted on the basis of seniority and credentials rather than
performance. Providing they have not violated some school norm, it is not
uncommon for teachers or administrators who demonstrate incompetence or
worse at their assigned tasks to be transferred, even promoted, to off-line
positions of higher authority rather than being fired, demoted, or retrained.
Perversely, the only path to formally recognized increase in status for dedicated,
talented teachers is to stop teaching, to change jobs and become
administrators. Some schools and states are starting to create Master Teacher
designations and other forms of status enhancement to address the need for
formal recognition of excellence, but the overwhelmingly dominant practice
provides no such acknowledgement for outstanding practitioners, thus lumping
all teachers together into an undifferentiated mass. This pervasive deskilling of
and condescension towards the teachers' craft is central to the organizational
culture of schools, and teachers' reaction against it forms the base of their
suspicions of the motives and values of technologists who claim to be able to
improve education by substituting the output of a teacher with that of a box.
 As with any organization possessed of a distinct and pervasive culture,
schools attract and retain either those most comfortable with their premises and
conditions, those without other options, or those who care deeply about the
organizational mission and are willing to accept the personal disadvantages that
may accompany a "calling." Most beginning teachers identify with the latter
group, and approach their nascent careers with excitement and commitment.
Indeed, they are prepared to work for not much money under difficult conditions
in order to pursue this commitment. It's in the nature of people and
organizations, however, for workaday values and practices to replace idealism
as the defining experience of place and purpose. This means that over the long
term the idealism and enthusiasm of the novice teacher must necessarily give
way to the veteran's acquiescence to routine. It is this willingness to accept the
values of the organizational culture and not the nature of the personal rewards
that determines who remains in teaching and who fails or leaves.
 In plumbing the nature of a bureaucratic organization, we must take into
account the personalities and skill sets of those who seek to join it. According to
studies cited by Howley et al, prospective teachers have lower test scores than
do prospective nurses, biologists, chemists, aeronautical engineers,
sociologists, political scientists, and public administrators (Howley, Pendarvis &
Howley, 1993). They also cite studies which demonstrate a negative correlation
between intellectual aptitude and the length of a teacher's career. Recognizing
that there are many reasons to dispute a correlation between standardized test
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scores with intellectual capacity, depth, or flexibility, Howley cites Galambos et 
al. to demonstrate that
teachers, as compared to arts and sciences graduates, take fewer
hours in mathematics, English, physics, chemistry, economics,
history, political sciences, sociology, other social sciences, foreign
languages, philosophy, and other humanities. (Galambos, Cornett &
Spitler, 1985)
  She reports other studies which show that teachers read no more, and
probably less, than the average middle class person (approximately three to
eight books per year) and that their reading tends overwhelmingly to be popular
material rather than scholarly or scientific work (Duffey, 1973, 1974; Vieth,
1981). The fact that teachers are not, as a group, accomplished or engaged
intellectuals does not require that they be resistant to change. It does suggest,
though, a certain comfort with stasis and a reluctance to expand both the
intellectual horizon and the skill set necessary to achieve proficiency with new
technologies. This may help to explain the unusually long latency required to
master personal computers that has been reported to Kerr and Sheingold by
teachers who have incorporated technological innovations into their practice
(Kerr, 1991; Sheingold, 1990).
  Given that long-term school workers are well adapted to a particular
ecosocial niche it is understandable that their first response to attempts at
innovation would be one of resistance. Calls for change of any kind are seen as
impositions or disturbances to be quelled as soon as possible, as unreasonable
attempts to change the rules in the middle of the game. Larry Cuban has
described the position of teachers as one of "situationally constrained choice,"
in which the ability to pursue options actively desired is limited by the
environment in which teachers work (Cuban, 1986). While this is true as far as it
goes, I prefer to see the process as one of gradual adaptation and
acquiescence to the values and processes of the organization, rather than the
continued resistance and frustration implied by Cuban; in other words, as one of
situationally induced adaptation. This, I think, more easily explains the affect
and frame of mind of most veteran teachers and administrators, and
accommodates the likelihood that the average teacher is no more heroic or
enduring than the average office worker.
THE CULTURE OF TECHNOLOGY
  If the State religion of America is Progress, then surely technology
provides its icons. It is largely through the production of ever-more marvelous
machines that we redeem the promise of a better tomorrow, confirm the world's
perfectibility, and resorb some to ourselves and to our institutions. As Cohen
succinctly puts it,
"...Americans have celebrated technology as a powerful force for
change nearly everywhere in social life...[and] are fond of picturing
technology as a liberating force: cleaning up the workplace, easing
workers' burdens, making the good life broadly available, increasing
disposable income, and the like." (Cohen, 1987, p. 154)
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 But it goes further than that. Our machines not only signal and refresh our
modernity, they serve as foundational metaphors for many of our institutions,
schools among them (See Note 2). Machines corporealize our rationality,
demonstrate our mastery. They always have a purpose and they are always
_prima facie_ suited to the task for which they were designed. Every machine is
an ideal type, and even the merest of them, immune to the thousand natural
shocks the flesh (and its institutions) is heir to, occupies a pinnacle of fitness
and manifests a clarity of purpose of which our institutions can only dream.
They reflect well on us, and we measure ourselves by their number and
complexity. It is nearly inconceivable that we would imagine a school to be
complete, no, to be American, that was without a representative sample of
these icons of affirmation. It is absolutely inconceivable that we would trust our
children, our posterity, to anything less than a machine, and so we relentlessly
build, and generally fill, our schools.
  For although they often seem so ageless and resilient as to be almost
Sphinx-like in their inscrutability, schools as we know them are both relatively
recent and consciously modeled on that most productive of all technologies, the
factory (Tyack, 1974). For at least the last hundred years, schools have been
elaborated as machines set up to convert raw materials (new students) into
finished products (graduates, citizens, workers) through the application of
certain processes (pedagogy, discipline, curricular materials, gym). It is this
processing function that drives the rationalist proposition that schools can be
tuned well or poorly, can be made more or less efficient in their operation.
Although it seldom articulates them overtly, this view is predicated on the
assumptions that we know what we want schools to do, that what we want is
unitary and can be measured, and that it can be affected by regular, replicable
modifications to one or more school processes. It presumes that the limits of
education are essentially technological limits and that better technology will
remove them. It is the most generic and encompassing theory of "educational
technology," since it embraces all curricular, instructional, and material aspects
of the school experience. In its more comprehensive and embracing
instantiations such an attitude does not limit its concerns only to the school
plant. For early progressive educators (and again today) students'
readiness-to-learn, in the form of adequate nutrition, housing, and medical care,
was seen as a proper concern for school "technologists."
 So far we can detect at least two impetuses for wanting to bring machines
into schools. The first is the desire of the central planner and social scientist to
have these social crucibles be as modern as the world of tomorrow they help
conjure into being. Cuban details how each new development in the
popularization of information and entertainment technology (radio, film,
television, computers) in society at large brought with it a corresponding
insistence that the deployment of this revolutionary machine into schools would,
finally, bring the classroom out of the dark ages and into the modern world
(Cuban, 1986). Attempts to deploy technology that follow this pattern seldom
specify how the machines will be used, and if outcomes are discussed at all it is
in vague, incantatory language that employs words more as talismans than as
descriptors. The connection between such scenarios and the outcomes they
believe they strive for is essentially semio- magical, using up-to-date machinery
to signify modernity and believing that the transformative power resides in the
box itself rather than in the uses to which it is put. Given their non-rational
character, it's not surprising that these initiatives originate with elected officials,
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school administrators, community groups (business, parents) and others for
whom the signalling function is important. They tend not to originate with
technologists or classroom teachers, who have very different (if very differing)
agendae.
  By "technologists" I mean those whose avowed goal is to make schooling
more efficient through the manipulation of its objects or processes. "Efficiency,"
however, is not the straightforward, value-free quantity that those who most
embrace it suppose it to be. An industrial-revolution coinage, the concept of
efficiency was intended to denote the relative quantity of useless energy
consumed during manufacturing or processing, contexts in which such things
can be easily and unambiguously measured. Clearly, the socially-situated
diffusion of skills and values that is our system of education presents a very
different case, one that is more complex, more contested, more informed by
subjectivity. In order to apply the concept of efficiency to such a messy world
technologists and others must narrow their gaze to focus on one particular
element of the process. (Under "others" I include economists, those
technologists-without-machines, whose persistent attempts to discover and
apply a production function to education in the face of piles of their own
unambiguous evidence, ranks with the alchemists' persevering search for the
philosopher's stone as one of rationality's great cul de sacs.) Technologists
have therefore tended to focus on the transfer of information to students, partly
because it is one of the few processes in schools that can be measured, and
partly because it is one of the few functions that everyone agrees schools
should perform. What they discovered almost immediately was that when
judged simply as knowledge-transfer machines schools are just not very good. It
seems to take an awful lot of workers, money, and other resources to transfer a
relatively small amount of information. By framing the question in this way,
technologists (re)cast education as a fundamentally didactic process, and
problems with education as problems of "instructional delivery." This didacticism
posits education as the transfer of information from a repository to a receptacle,
a cognitive diffusion gradient across a membrane constituted not by the rich,
tumultuous, contradictory social processes that situate the student, the teacher,
and the school within society, but solely by the "instructional delivery vehicle."
By this light, of course, nearly any organic, indigenous school practice or
organization will be found wanting, since schools intend to promote many
outcomes ahead of information transfer.
 The second concern of technologists has been standardization. Schools
are supposed to produce the same outputs year after year. They are supposed
to ensure that seventh graders, say, will emerge at essentially the same age
with essentially the same sets of skills and broad values this year as last. If they
do not then important categories like "seventh grade" or even "common school"
lose their meaning. Signalling functions aside, the explicit reason given for
modelling schools on factories was their promise of standardization, of
uniformity of outcome. Technologists and planners have long realized that the
weakest link in this chain is the last, "the instructional delivery vehicle," the
teacher. Standardization of curricula, of facilities, of teacher certification
requirements, means little once the classroom door is closed and the teacher is
alone with her students. The inefficiency and variability of this last crucial stage
undoes all prior ratiocination. For this reason, educational technologists have
tended to produce solutions designed not to aid the teacher, but to recast,
recapitulate, or replace her, either with machines or through the introduction of
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"teacher-proof" curricula (See Note 3).
 Yet all these attempts to modernize, to rationalize, to "improve" the
schools by making them more efficient have had very little effect. Textbooks,
paperbacks, blackboards, radio, film, film strips, airplanes, television, satellite
systems and telecommunications have all in their time been hailed as
modernizers of American education (Cuban, 1986). Cohen, for his part,
demonstrates how, with the exception of the textbook and the blackboard, none
of these much vaunted exemplars of modern efficiency have had any significant
effect on school organization or practice (Cohen, 1987). They have not made
schools more modern, more efficient, more congruent with the world outside the
school, or had any of the myriad other effects their advocates were sure they
would have. Why is this so?
THE CULTURE OF REFUSAL
  Technology can potentially work change on both the organizational and
practice patterns of schools. That change can subvert or reinforce existing lines
of power and information, and this change can be, for the technologist or the
school personnel, intentional, inadvertent or a combination of the two. Since
schools are not monolithic but composed of groups with diverse and generally
competing interests on the rational, organizational, and symbolic levels,
adoption and implementation of a proposed technology are two very different
matters.
  And yet each battle is essentially the same battle. The technologists'
rhetoric is remarkably consistent regardless of the specifics of the machine at
issue. So too is their response when the technologies in question meet with only
a lukewarm response: to blame the stubborn backwardness of teachers or the
inflexibility and insularity of school culture. While elements of both of these
certainly play their part in what I'll call 'technology refusal' on the part of schools,
it behooves us to remember that all technologies have values and practices
embedded within them. In this respect, at least, technology is never neutral; it
always makes a difference. From this perspective, the reactionary response on
the part of schools (by which I mean the response of individuals within schools
acting to support their institutional function) perceived by technology advocates
makes a great deal more sense than the pig-headed Luddism so often
portrayed. Further, technology refusal represents an immediate and, I believe,
fundamentally accurate assessment of the challenges to existing structures and
authority that are embodied or embedded in the contested technology. I believe
further that the depth of the resistance is generally and in broad strokes
proportionate to the seriousness of the actual threat.
 Change advocates, of whom technologists are a permanent subset, often
try to have things both ways. On the one hand, the revolutionary potential of the
innovation is emphasized, while at the same time current practitioners are
reassured (implicitly or explicitly) that their roles, positions, and relationships will
remain by and large as they were before. The introduction of computers, for
example, is hailed in one discourse (directed towards the public and towards
policy makers) as a process which will radically change the nature of what goes
on in the classroom, give students entirely new sets of skills, and permanently
shift the terrain of learning and schools. In other discourse (directed towards
administrators and teachers) computers are sold as straightforward tools to
assist them in carrying out pre-existing tasks and fulfilling pre-existing roles, not
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as Trojan Horses whose acceptance will ultimately require the acquisition of an
entirely new set of skills and world outlook. Since school workers and their
practice do not (indeed, cannot) fully maximize instructional delivery, the
"remedies" or alternatives proposed by technologists necessarily embody overt
or implicit critiques of workers' world view as well as their practices. The more
innovative the approach the greater its critique, and hence its threat to existing
principles and order. When confronted with this challenge, workers have two
responses from which to choose. They can ignore or subvert implementation of
the change or they can coopt or repurpose it to support their existing practices.
In contrast to generalized reform efforts, which Sarason maintains are more
likely to be implemented the more radical they are, these efforts by
technologists to change the institution of schooling from the classroom up make
teachers the objects rather than the subjects of the reformist gaze (Sarason,
1990). The more potent and pointed technologists' ill-concealed disinterest in or
disregard for the school-order of things, the less likely their suggestion are to be
put into practice. The stated anxiety of teachers worried about losing their jobs
to machines is also a resistance to the re-visioning of the values and purposes
of schooling itself, a struggle over the soul of school. It is about self-interest, to
be sure, but it is also about self-definition.
 Much of the question of teacher self-definition revolves around the anxiety
generated by their unfamiliarity and incompetence with the new machines. The
fear of being embarrassed is a major de-motivating factor in the acquisition of
the skills required to use computer technology in the classroom (Honey &
Moeller, 1990; Kerr, 1991; Sheingold & Hadley, 1990). This is an area where
institutional and individual interests converge to produce a foregone effect. The
(self) selection for teaching of individuals who by and large show neither interest
nor aptitude for ongoing intellectual development buttressed by the condition of
lifetime employment almost guarantees a teacher corps that is extremely
reluctant to attempt change. This, in turn, suits the interests of school
management whose job is made considerably simpler with a population of
workers whose complacence acts as a buffer against change. Since teachers'
situationally-reinforced lack of motivation inhibits their action as change agents,
school administrators are relieved of the responsibility for developing the
creative management skills that would be required for teachers to develop new
classroom skills.
 There are technologies which are suited perfectly to such a climate; those
that either actively support the organization of schools or are flexible enough to
readily conform to it (Cohen, 1987). Not surprisingly, they are the ones that are
so ubiquitous, so integrated into school practice as to be almost invisible. On
the classroom level we would expect to find tools and processes that both ease
the physical labor of the teacher while maintaining her traditional role within the
classroom. The blackboard, the duplicating machine, and the overhead
projector come immediately to mind. All enhance the teacher's authoritative
position as information source, and reduce the physical effort required to
communicate written information so that more energy can be devoted to the
non-didactic tasks of supervision, arbitration, and administration. This type of
technology seldom poses a threat to any of the teacher's functions, is
fundamentally supportive of the school-values mentioned earlier, and
reproduces locally the same types of power and information relationships
through which the teacher herself engages her administrators. We might also
consider the school intercom system. Ideally suited to the purposes of
11 of 23
centralized authority and the one-way flow of information, it is as ubiquitous in
classrooms as its polar opposite, the direct-dial telephone, is rare. Technologies
such as these will seldom meet with implementation resistance from teachers
because they support them in the roles through which teachers define
themselves, and contain no critique of teachers' practice, skills, or values. In
general, resources that can be administered, that can be made subject to
central control and organization, will find more favor from both administrators
and teachers than those that cannot.
 These examples of successful technologies confirm the requirement of
simplicity if a technology is to become widely dispersed through classrooms.
This has partly to do with the levels of general teacher aptitude described
above, partly with the amount of time available to teachers to learn new tools,
and partly with the very real need for teachers to appear competent. As with
prison administration and dog training, a constant concern in the running of
schools is that the subject population not be reminded what little genuine
authority supports the power its masters exercise. Although there are more
complex models for understanding the diffuse polysemous generation of power
and status that comprise the warp and woof of institutional fabric (see Foucault
on medicine or prisons, for example), for our purposes here a simple model of
authority- as-imposition will suffice. In this tradition, French and Raven describe
the five sources of power as follows:
Reward, the power to give or withhold something the other wants;1.
Coercive, the power to inflict some kind of punishment;2.
Legitimate, the use of institutionally-sanctioned position or authority;3.
Referent, the use of personal attraction, the desire to be like the other, or
to be identified with what the other is identified with;
4.
Expert, the authority that derives from superior skill or competence.
(French & Raven, 1968).
5.
  Short of insurrection, the only form of power accessible to students is
Expert power. Thus, an unfortunate (but hardly unforeseeable) consequence of
school organization is that teachers for whom authority is important must
prevent their students from acquiring or demonstrating mastery of a degree or a
domain that would reflect unfavorably on the teacher. Although some teachers
handle it with more grace and maturity than others, most dread the occasions
when they are "shown up" by their students, and we have all witnessed or
experienced those awkward, lingering out-of-time moments when the teacher
must voluntarily cede authority to the student who knows how to thread the
projector or connect the VCR. At such times the brittle consensual veneer of
adult expertise is cracked, the order of things briefly disrupted (confirmed by the
sudden eruption of murmuring in the classroom), and casual but alert attention
directed by teacher and students alike toward the performance of the
evanescent student expert.
 It is one thing for students to demonstrate expertise in areas that are not
expected to be a formal part of teachers' skill set, like threading 16mm
projectors. If technologists have their way, however, teachers will be expected
to know how to use computers, networks, and databases with the same facility
they now use blackboards and textbooks, and with greater facility than the
roomful of resourceful, inquisitive students who were weaned on the stuff. The
pressure towards competence and the acquisition of new skills, which is
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generally not a feature of school culture or the employment contracts under
which teachers work, will be strong. It will come from unexpected directions:
from below (from the "tools" themselves) and from within, as teachers struggle
to retain mastery over their students. It's easy to see why teachers would resist
this scenario. Administrators, for their part, have equally few organizational
incentives for inviting this disruption into schools. Not only would they be
required to respond to teachers' demands for the time and resources needed to
attain proficiency, they themselves would need to attain some minimum level of
competence in order to retain authority over teachers. Since there is no way for
the system to reward this kind of involved, responsible management, nor any
way to penalize its absence, school authorities' most sensible route is to ignore
or quell demands for the implementation of such potentially disruptive
processes.
  The machines of the day are microcomputers and microcomputer
networks. Having inherited the mantle of modernity from instructional television
and computer-aided instruction, they are presently charged with the
transformation of schools. As school technologies, however, they are unusually
polyvalent: they can both support and subvert the symbolic, organizational, and
normative dimensions of school practice. They can weaken or strengthen the
fields of power and information which emanate from the institutional positions of
students, teachers, and administrators. It's my thesis that authority and status
within organizations are constituted from two sources: power, itself sourced as
outlined by French and Raven, and control over and access to the form and
flow of information. Authority and status are singularities, as it were, produced
by a particular confluence of (potentially) shifting fields of power and
information. This is true in the organizational sense for all bureaucracies, where
the person who knows something is as important as the person who can do
something. In schools, though, facility with information is (in a slightly different
sense) at the heart of key norms, values, and practices as well. As bureaucratic,
hierarchical institutions and as concretizations of a particular tradition of
pedagogy, schools teach and model as canonical a particular arrangement of
paths for the flow of information. Introducing computers into schools highlights
these assumptions, causes these normally invisible assumptions and channels
to fluoresce.
  It is not their capacity to process information that gives computers this
special ability. Data processing systems have existed in large school districts for
decades, helping central administration to run their organizations more
efficiently. Irregularities of control call attention to themselves and thereby
remind workers that such arrangements are created things, neither aboriginal
nor ahistorical but purpose-built and recent. To the extent that automation can
help existing administrative processes to run more smoothly and recede into the
background, they help to reintroduce a kind of medieval reassurance regarding
the rightness and permanence of a given order. Schools and school workers,
particularly, seem to prefer this type of predictability. Such data processing
regimes also relieve school workers of much of the tedium of their
administrative work: scheduling, grading, communication, and tracking are all
made less drudging by automation. The easing of these burdens offered by the
machine fits very well with popular conceptions of these labor- saving devices
and offers workers a benefit in exchange for their participation in a process
which strengthens the mechanisms of control exerted by the bureaucracy over
their daily lives and practice. To the extent that they are aware of this bargain at
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all most are willing to accept it.
  This strengthening of administrative priority and control over teachers is
recapitulated by teachers over students when computers are used for CAI or as
"integrated learning systems." Although they have fallen out of favor somewhat
of late, the vast majority of school-based computer use has taken place in this
context. Kids are brought en masse to a (generally) windowless room presided
over by a man with no other function than to administer the machines. There
they work for between 30 and 50 minutes on drill-and-practice software that
compels them to perform simple tasks over and over until they have reached a
preset level of proficiency, at which time they are started on new tasks.
  This behaviorist fantasy fits neatly into the organizational model of
schools, and into much pedagogical practice as well. The progress and work
habits of each student are carefully tracked by the server. Reports can be
generated detailing the number of right and wrong answers, the amount of time
spent on each question, the amount of "idle" time spent between questions, the
number of times the student asked the system for help, the tools she used, etc.
Not much use is ever made of this information (assuming some could be)
except to compare students and classes against one another. Nevertheless, the
ability to monitor work habits, to break tasks down into discrete chunks, and the
inability of the student to determine what she works on or how she works on it
fits quite well into the rationalist model of the school-as-factory and the
technologists goal of maximizing "instructional delivery."
  Such systems were an easy sell. They complemented existing
organizational and practice models, and they signalled modernity and
standardization (Newman, 1992). (Perversely, they were also claimed to
promote individualization, since each student was tasked and speeded
separately from the rest of the group. The fact she was working on exactly the
same problems, with the same tools and in the same sequence as her
classmates seems not to have mattered.) Since students work in isolation they
accord well with the premise of structured competition. Since mastery at one
level leads relentlessly to more difficult (but essentially identical) problems the
students never have a chance to exhibit facility of a type that would threaten
their teacher, and since the terminals at which they work are both limited in their
capacities and centrally controlled students have no opportunity to acquire a
disruptive mastery of the technology itself. Labs like these are prime examples
of the non- neutrality of technology. They do not foster all or even several types
of learning but rather one particular, and particularly narrow, conception whose
origin is not with teachers who work with children but with the technologists,
industrialists, and military designers who develop "man-machine systems"
(Noble, 1991). They do not encourage or even permit many types of classroom
organization but only one. They instantiate and enforce only one model of
organization, of pedagogy, of relationship between people and machines. They
are biased, and their easy acceptance into schools is indicative of the extent to
which that bias is shared by those who work there.
  The technology I have been describing is not the technology of
computers, or computers-in-schools per se, any more than armored cars
represent the technology of internal combustion or washing machines the
technology of electromagnetic induction. They are machines, to be sure, but
machines require a social organization to become technologies. Thus the uses
of computers described above for data-processing and "learning labs" are not
examples of computer technologies but of normative, administrative, and
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pedagogical technologies supported by computers.
  This distinction is important because many teachers, lay people, and
some administrators have concluded from their experiences with such systems
that computers in school are anathema to their notions of what schools ought to
do with and for children. Computer-based technologies of the kind described
above are hardly "neutral." Indeed, they are intensely normative and send
unambiguous signals about what school is for and what qualities teachers ought
to emulate and model. Interpersonal and social dynamics, serendipity, cognitive
apprenticeship, and play all seem to be disdained by this instantiation of
machine learning. The teacher's fear of "being replaced by a computer" is a
complex anxiety. It obviously has a large component of institutional self-interest,
since no one wants to lose their job. But the notion that it would be possible to
be replaced by a machine cuts deeper, to the heart of teachers' identity and
self-respect. There has evolved among teachers an insular culture of
self-congratulation that attempts to reassure them that they are competent and
selfless professionals, that their social and institutional function is to develop the
very best qualities in the children they serve. The suggestion that the de-skilled
tasks that teachers are called upon to perform might be better performed by
machines calls this self-image into question in a manner that is painfully direct.
It is hence unwelcome.
  Beyond the question of self-respect but intertwined with it is the
frustration that many teachers experience with the promulgation of a purely
rationalist notion of education. Teachers, after all, are witness and partner to
human development in a richer and more complex sense than educational
technologists will ever be. Schools are where children grow up. They spend
more waking hours in school with their teachers than they do at home with their
parents. The violence that technologists do to our only public children's space
by reducing it to an "instructional delivery vehicle" is enormous, and teachers
know that. To abstract a narrow and impoverished concept of human sentience
from the industrial laboratory and then inflict it on children for the sake of
"efficiency" is a gratuitous, stunting stupidity and teachers know that, too. Many
simply prefer not to collaborate with a process they experience as
fundamentally disrespectful to kids and teachers alike.
  Finally, there is the issue of the reshaping and redefining of teaching
practice to suit the needs of technology. Cuban and Cohen maintain that
technologies that are not sufficiently flexible to suit the existing strictures of
classroom practice have little chance of significant implementation (Cohen,
1987; Cuban, 1986). While this may be true for "instructional delivery vehicles"
like educational films or television, it doesn't hold for the myriad other
educational technologies whose domain and deployment are not circumscribed
by an individual classroom. The most obvious example is standardized testing.
There is an extensive body of literature which shows that this technology,
seldom supported and often resisted by teachers, has nevertheless had
profound consequences on their classroom practice (Shepard & Dougherty,
1991; Shepard, 1991). Teachers have significantly reoriented the content and
method of their instruction to facilitate capture by these instruments. Despite the
absence of formal institutional sanctions, teachers have succumbed to strong
pressure from their administrations for students to perform well on these tests,
and have restructured their practice accordingly. The dictum that, "when the
classroom door closes teachers can do what they like," doesn't apply when
crucial technologies of assessment reside outside the classroom (See Note 4).
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Teachers are hence understandably concerned that the introduction of
computers in the form of a technology with its own built-in assessment
capabilities will not function to provide them with another tool they can use or
not as they wish, but rather that it might force them to tailor the content and
style of their teaching to suit the technology.
CULTURAL CHANGE
  In this essay I've painted a rather depressing picture of schools as grim,
self-perpetuating systems of repressive mediocrity for their employees and their
students. I've described how technologies are variously embraced and resisted
in the effort to perpetuate this system and maintain the organizational status
quo. I've tried to make clear that since schools are complex organizations not all
their component members or constituencies have identical interests at all times;
that a technology that is favorable to one faction at a given moment may be
resisted by another which might favor it for different reasons under different
circumstances. Most importantly, I've tried to show that technologies are neither
value-free nor constituted simply by machines or processes themselves. Rather,
they are the uses of machines in support of highly normative, value-laden
institutional and social systems.
  I don't believe that decisions to deploy or not deploy a given technology
are made with diabolic or conspiratorial intent. I don't believe that teachers and
administrators consciously plot to consolidate their hegemony. Rather, I believe
that the mental model under which they operate forecloses some options even
before they can be formally considered, while making others seem natural,
neutral, and, most dangerously, value- free. It is those latter options, those
'easy' technologies that are adopted and implemented in schools. If one accepts
this framework, there are only two ways to imagine a relationship between an
introduction of technology into schools and a substantive change in what
schools do and how they do it. The first is to believe that some technologies can
function as Trojan Horses; that is, that they can engender practices which
schools find desirable or acceptable but which nevertheless operationalize new
underlying values which in turn bring about fundamental change in school
structure and practice.
  The second is to hope that schools will come to re-evaluate the social
purposes they serve, the manner in which they serve them, or the principles of
socially-developed cognition from which they operate. The impetus for this
change may be internal, as teachers and administrators decide that their
self-interest in serving new purposes is greater than their interest in
perpetuating the existing scheme of things. It may be external, as powerful
outside forces adjust the inputs available to and outputs desired from the
schools. It may be institutional, as restructuring initiatives encourage schools to
compete with one another in a newly-created educational marketplace.
  To a certain extent all these processes are underway, albeit slowly,
unevenly, and under contestation. On the Trojan Horse front, there are more
and more reports of teachers taking physical and pedagogical control of
computers from the labs and the technologists. They are being placed in
classrooms and used as polymorphic resources, facilitators, and enablers of
complex social learning activities (Newman, 1990, 1992; Kerr, 1991). As
computers themselves grow farther from their origins as military-industrial
technologies, educational technologists increasingly are people whose values
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are more child-centered than those of their predecessors. This is reflected in the
software they create, the uses they imagine for technology, and their ideas
about exploration and collaboration (Char & Newman, 1986; Wilson & Tally,
1991; Collins & Brown, 1986). If students, parents, and teachers are all pleased
with the cognitive and affective changes induced locally by working with these
types of tools (and it is by no means certain that they will be), it may become
difficult to sustain the older, more repressive features of school organization of
which centrally-administered and imposed technology is but one example.
  The second possibility, that schools will re-evaluate their means and
ends, also seems to have momentum behind it, at least within a somewhat
circumscribed compass. Teachers and administrators are taking steps to secure
the autonomy neccesary to re-engineer schools-as-technologies, though not all
are happy with this unforeseen responsibility and some choose to abdicate it.
Nevertheless, for the first time practitioners are being given the chance to
re-design schools based on what they've learned from their experiences with
children. Given that chance, many teachers and administrators are
demonstrating that schools and school technology can support practices of the
kind which reflect values described by Wendell Berry in another context as care,
competence, and frugality in the uses of the world (Berry, 1970). This, in turn,
precipitates a re-visioning of the purposes and organization of school
technologies away from the top-down, centrally-administered, instantiations
which have failed so remarkably in the past.
  Most importantly, however, I believe that the dominant mechanical
metaphor on which we model our institutions is changing. As we move from
machine to information models we will inevitably require that our institutions
reflect the increased fluidity, immanence, and ubiquity that such models
presuppose (See Note 5). As we change our medieval conceptions of
information from something that is stored in a fixed, canonical form in a
repository designed exclusively for that purpose and whose transfer is a formal,
specialized activity that takes place mainly within machines called schools,
schools will change too. They will not, as some naively claim, become
redundant or vestigial simply because their primacy as information-processing
modelers is diminished (Perelman, 1992). Rather, they will continue to perform
the same functions they always have: those relating to the reproduction of the
values and processes of the society in which they're situated.
  What this underlines, I think, is that machines can indeed change the
culture of organizations, even ones as entrenched and recalcitrant as schools
have proven to be. But they do it not, as technologists have generally imagined,
by enabling schools to do the same job only better (more cheaply, more
efficiently, more consistently, more equitably) but by causing them to change
their conception of both what it is they do and the world in which they do it. This
shift is not instigated by the machines deployed within schools but by those
outside of it, those that shape and organize the social, economic, and
informative relationships in which schools are situated and which they
perpetuate. This is not the same as saying that machines which are widely used
outside the classroom will automatically diffuse osmotically into the classroom
and be used there: history shows that this is clearly not the norm.
  What is happening, simply put, is that the wide, wet world is rapidly
changing the ways it organizes its work, its people, and its processes,
reconceptualizing them around the metaphors and practices enabled and
embodied by its new supreme machines, distributed microcomputer networks.
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Archaic organizations from the CIA to IBM to the university have fundamentally
rearranged themselves along the lines I've outlined in the notes to this report.
Schools have been out of step with this change, and it is this misalignment
more than anything else that causes us to say that schools are "failing" when in
fact they are doing exactly the jobs they were set up and refined over
generations to perform. It is the world around them that has changed, so much
so that the jobs we asked them to carry out now seem ridiculous, now make us
angry.
  The fundamental instinct of durable organizations is to resist change: that
is why they are durable. As schools scurry to serve the new bidding of the old
masters, and as they induct younger workers raised and trained under the
auspices of new models and new practices, we discover-- not surprisingly - -that
schools too are reorienting themselves along the lines of the latest dominant
machine and, consequently, welcome those machines inside to assist in their
nascent realignment of means and ends.
  The norms and procedures of entrenched bureaucratic organizations are
strong and self-reinforcing. They attract people of like minds and repel or expel
those who don't share them. Schools are technologies, machines with a
purpose. They embed their norms and processes in their outputs, which in the
case of schools helps them to further strengthen their cultural position and resist
marginalization. But they can never be independent of the values of society at
large: if those change, as I believe they are beginning to, then schools must too.
If they do not, then they will be replaced, relegated to the parts-bin of history.
Notes
This usage of the schools to promote an "outside" agenda once again
invokes their role as a transmission technology even as it fails to take into
account the schools' own values and culture. It shares the technologists'
instrumentalism, albeit to different ends.
1.
Although we may apotheosize this habit we didn't invent it. The desire to
apprehend the complexity of the world, to encompass it in a more
immediately accessible form, gives Western culture a long, albeit narrow,
history of mechanical and neo-mechanical metaphor. The shift from one
metaphor to another generally lags technology itself by a generation or so,
and each shift to a new metaphor drastically effects the way cultures view
the natural and human worlds.
  Until the fourteenth century there were no such metaphors. Indeed,
the rope of nearly all metaphor, metonymy, and analogy was tied to the
natural or supernatural rather than to the created world, simply because
there were no complex machines as we understand them today. The
invention of the astrolabe, and its close and quick descendant, the clock,
provided the first tangible human creation whose complexity was sufficient
to embody the observed complexity of the natural world. It's at this time
that we start seeing references to the intricate 'workings' of things and of
their proper 'regulation,' usually of the cosmos and nature, although
occasionally of human systems as well. The clock, with its numerous
intricate, precise, and interlocking components, and felicitous ability to
corporealize the abstraction of temporality, shaped western perceptions of
the world by serving as its chief systemic metaphor for the next five
hundred years.
2.
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  In the early nineteenth-century, the metaphor of the clock was
gradually replaced by that of the engine, and somewhat more generally,
by the notion of the machine as a phylum unto itself. The figures shift from
those of intricacy and precision to those of 'drive' and 'power,' from
regulation to motivation. In the early twentieth-century, as technology
became more sophisticated, the concepts of motivation and regulation
were to some extent merged in the figure of the self-regulating machine.
This is essentially the dominant metaphor with which we've grown up, the
notion of a 'system' which contains the means of both its own perpetuity
and its own governance, and this metaphor has been applied to
everything from political science, to nature, to the human body, to the
human mind. The enginic 'drive' of the Freudian unconscious, Darwinian
evolution, and the Marxian proletariat give way to 'family systems,'
ecosystems, and political equilibria as the Industrial Revolution lurches to
a close.
  The edges of a new metaphor for complex systems can be seen
emerging, however, one which is able to embrace the relativity and
immanence which stress mechanical metaphors to the point of fatigue:
that of the computer and its data networks. We see, and will see more,
large-scale shifts away from the concepts of drive and regulation to those
of processing and transmission. The raw material upon which processes
act will be regarded not as objects and forces but as data, which is not a
thing but immanence itself, an arbitrary arrangement given temporary and
virtual form. The action will be seen as a program, a set of instructions,
allowing for more or fewer degrees of freedom. Interrelationships will be
embodied in paths, arrangements, and pointers rather than linkages
(creakingly mechanical) through which objects transmit force. Important
phylogenic distinctions will be made between hardware (that which is
fixed/infrastructure) and software (that which determines use and
function).
  This has tremendous consequences for our notions of property, of
originality and authorship, of privacy and relationship. It may, perhaps, be
less limiting than the mechanical metaphors it will largely displace.
It is neither possible nor desirable to ignore the issue of gender here. It
may be coincidence that the classroom, the one place where women have
historically had a dominant institutional place, is repeatedly characterized
by technologists as a place of darkness and chaos, stubbornly resistant to
the enlightening gifts of rationalized technology. It may be coincidence
that educational technologists are as a group overwhelmingly male but
direct their efforts at transformation not at the powerful (and
overwhelmingly male) community of planners and administrators but at the
formally powerless and (overwhelmingly female) community of
practitioners. It may be coincidence that the terms used to describe the
insufficiency of the classroom and to condescend to the folk-craft of
teaching are the same terms used by an androgenized society to derogate
women's values and women's work generally. But that's a lot of
coincidence.
  Kerr discusses the differences in world-view and values between
the teachers who deal with children and the technologists who approach
the classroom from industrial and, as Noble demonstrates, often military
backgrounds as well (Kerr, 1990; Noble, 1991). He stops short of
3.
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characterizing what may perhaps be obvious but nevertheless should be
acknowledged: the casual, pervasive, pathetic misogyny which
characterizes the attitude of dominant culture towards any environment or
activity that is predominantly female. It is perhaps for this reason that we
never see proposals to replace (mostly male) administrators with
machines. The usage of computers to perform administrative tasks should
pose no more, and probably fewer, value dilemmas and conflicts than
their usage to define and practice teaching.
The question of capture processes in education deserves more
exploration than I can give it here. As put forth by Agre, "capture"
describes the restructuring of workplace practices to facilitate the capture
of information by a ubiquitous network technology. It contrasts with the
surveillance model, which relies on visual metaphors, is surreptitious, and
is centrally organized. Capture processes, on the other hand, don't watch
what you do but continuously interact with it. They are about as far from
surreptitious as you can get, since they involve the active reorganization of
activities for the explicit purpose of gathering information. Rather than
being centrally directed they are (re)enacted by individuals as they
perform a socially-embedded set of tasks. Agre cites as examples
Automatic Vehicle Identification for highway toll collection, and the
organization of large restaurant chains where every action from the
greeting of customers to the taking of orders to the preparation of food is
designed around the needs of computerized information capture (Agre,
1993).
4.
In the shift from a mechanical to a digital organization of society we can
expect the following changes in the social construction of relationship:
Information, not authority; networks and pointers, not linkages;
inexpensive ubiquity, not dear scarcity; simultaneous possession, not
mutually- exclusive ownership; instantaneity/timeshifting, not temporality;
community of interests, not community of place; distributed horizontality
not centralized verticality. I don't contend that we thereby usher in Utopia.
These new structures will bring new strictures. But they will be very, very,
different.
5.
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